We study stock trading in Thailand, where binding foreign ownership limits fragment stock trading into distinct markets for locals and foreigners. Although barriers are significant, we observe substantial trading by foreigners on the local board and by locals on the foreign board. These cross-market traders tend to submit orders when liquidity is high and fill their orders at relatively beneficial prices. They trade on patterns in stock returns and prices across markets, and display profitable holding period returns and enhancements to price discovery that suggest informed trading. Our evidence echoes the features and predictions of classic theories of microstructure, information, and trading.
Introduction
This paper examines a unique equity market structure. In Thailand, regulators and individual companies impose limits on the fraction of a company's equity that can be held by foreigners.
1 When interest in Thailand's stock market and in emerging markets generally began to pick up in the middle 1980s, the fraction of shares owned by foreigners began to hit these limits for many listed companies. In late 1987, the stock exchange organized a formal market, the Alien Board, where foreigners could trade shares of companies that had reached their foreign ownership limit. Prices on the Alien Board typically exceed prices for otherwise identical shares restricted to local investors by a substantial premium. 2 Although trading is formally segmented into distinct boards for local investors and foreign investors, investors can cross to the "other"
board, but at a cost. Thai investors can hold Alien Board shares, but must pay the price premium to do so. Foreign investors can buy Main Board shares, but lose cash and stock dividends, warrants, other distributions, and voting rights because foreigners cannot register such shares once the foreign ownership limit is reached. The trading system on both boards is electronic and order-driven. Broker screens display depth at the three best bid and ask prices, but do not reveal trader identity.
This unusual institutional setting helps us study some interesting issues at the intersection of a number of strands of the finance literature. First and foremost, what market and investor behaviors do we observe in a multiple market setting where some investors cross 1 Prior to the 1997 Asian crisis, all companies listed on the Thai exchange had to be legally "Thai", implying a maximum foreign ownership of 49%. The government imposed a tighter limit, 25%, in certain industries, such as banking. The heavily-traded companies in our sample were all listed prior to 1997. 2 The price premium between the two boards cannot be arbitraged away. Once the foreign ownership limit has been reached, shares bought on the Main Board cannot be sold on the Alien Board. Shares bought on the Alien Board can be sold on the Main Board, but the typically substantial price premium would be lost. If a particular stock never reaches the foreign ownership limit or its foreign ownership drops below the limit, all trading occurs on the Main Board. Another aspect worth mentioning is that, when a local buys an Alien Board share, stock exchange records retain its status as eligible for trading on the Alien Board.
between markets? As we describe in the next section and beyond, theoretical and empirical papers in the market microstructure literature and related areas inspire us to study the effects of liquidity and information on patterns of market activity in Thailand's multiple-market setting.
Furthermore, our data includes some information about the identity of the trader standing behind each order. Specifically, we kno w whether each order is associated with a foreigner (almost certainly an institution), a Thai institution, a member of the stock exchange, or a Thai individual.
Locals may benefit from access to more or better information about local companies, while institutional investors may benefit from more resources and experience.
We conduct a series of empirical tests with intraday records of orders and trades from Thailand in 1999. A summary of our findings is as follows. In spite of the costs to switching to the "other" market, foreigners account for fifteen percent of the trading volume on the Main Board, and Thai individuals account for forty-four percent of the trading volume on the Alien
Board. 3 There is much evidence that liquidity is a driver of cross-market trading. Cross-market orders tend to be submitted at times of high liquidity (that is, low bid-ask spread and high depth)
in the market to which investors cross, and, as a consequence, cross-market orders tend to be filled at relatively better prices. 4 Some evidence also suggests a relationship between information and cross-market trading. Cross-market traders appear to use market information to trade on mean-reversion in price differentials across the two boards and other patterns. Holding period returns based on cross-market trades appear particularly profitable, suggesting that some cross-market activity represents informed trading. Cross-market trading also appears to 3 Werner and Kleidon (1996) study British stocks cross-listed in London and New York, and suggest that some investors voluntarily segment themselves in one market, as does the "location of trade" literature (Froot and Dabera, 1999; Chan, Hameed, and Lau, 2003) .
contribute to price discovery, again suggesting informed trading. 5 Thus, Thailand's fragmented market structure displays a variety of investor behaviors that echo the assumptions and implications of theoretical works on market microstructure and on information and capital markets that we describe below.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our tests. Section 3 discusses the data, relevant institutional details of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, and some of the basic calculations and transformations of the data needed for our tests. Section 4 presents results while Section 5 is a summary and conclusion.
Motivation and overview of tests
To think about the phenomenon of parallel markets with access varying across different types of traders, we start with some well-known theoretical works. In the multiple markets model of Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) , small uniformed investors cannot move across markets while informed traders and large discretionary liquidity traders optimize where and how they trade. In the Thai market, the frictions that impede crossing between the Main and Alien boards depend on whether the trader is a local or foreigner, and are also likely to vary across individual and institutional investors. In Madhavan (1995) , informed investors and large liquidity traders also benefit by spreading their trading across more than one market. A fragmented trading environment may persist, rather than consolidating at a single venue. In Subrahmanyam (1991) , informed traders have information about individual securities or about market-wide performance.
As a consequence, discretionary liquidity traders may trade both individual stocks and stock index futures to avoid the informed traders. In Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , discretionary liquidity traders may choose to "swim with the sharks", that is, suffer some disadvantageous trading with informed traders in order to enjoy greater liquidity. High liquidity also tends to attract informed traders, who seek to mask their information. While none of these models corresponds precisely to the Thai institutional setting, they provide intuition for motivating and interpreting our tests relating trading to liquidity and information.
Our tests focus on cross-market trading, that is, trading in shares that have reached the foreign ownership limit by foreigners on the Main Board and by locals on the Alien Board.
First, after presenting and discussing summary statistics, we examine associations between liquidity and cross-market trading activity. Motivated by the theoretical papers described above, we seek to uncover patterns that reveal the forces underlying cross-market trading. Some investors may be willing to pay a cost to trade in the "other" market, in search of liquidity to minimize adverse price movements, or to mask their information. Therefore, we test whether cross-market trading in Thailand is associated with particularly high liquidity in the market investors cross to.
Second, we examine whether cross-market trading appears to be motivated by information. As argued by the theoretical models described above, both large liquidity traders and informed traders may benefit by spreading their trading across more than one market. To distinguish between these two types of traders, we examine the use of market information by cross-market traders, the ir long-term trading profits, and the effect of their cross-market trading on price discovery. Some cross-market traders may condition their trading strategies on market information, while other cross-market activity may consist of informed trading that results in larger trading profits and improved price discovery between the two markets.
Some of our tests parallel earlier stud ies of other markets. In a study of Canadian stocks that trade both in Canada and the U.S., Eun and Sabherwal (2003) find that price discovery is greatest in the market that has higher trading volume, liquidity, and proportion of informed trades. Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2005) find different responses to corporate news across dual boards in Singapore and Thailand. While Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) report that foreign investors in the Korean stock market trade at disadvantageous prices relative to local investors, other authors (Seasholes, 2000; Chang, 2003; Dvorak, 2005) report that foreigners enjoy superior performance.
3. Data and sample selection
Stock Exchange of Thailand data
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) commenced operations under the name "Securities Exchange of Thailand" on April 30 th 1975. Its predecessor, the Bangkok Stock
Exchange, was founded in 1962 but faded away in the early 1970s due to low trading volume and poor stock performance. Starting in 1991, the SET has operated as a fully automated market that matches incoming orders on price and time priority. Minimum price increments, daily price limits, and circuit breakers are part of the market structure. Virtually all trading is based on ordinary limit orders, although other types of orders are permitted. 6 Additionally, a small amount of "upstairs trading" is reported through the SET computer system.
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Percentage limits on the amount of equity that can be registered by foreigners vary across listed firms. When foreign holdings of a particular firm reach their limit, trading commences on a second market, the Alien Board. 8 Prices on the Alien Board typically exceed those on the Main Board significantly. See Figure 1 which plots the capitalization-weighted average Alien Board 6 In January 1999, for example, 2,008,368 orders were submitted to the Main and Alien boards. Of these, 150 were "at-the-open" orders , 887 were market orders, 17 were "immediate or cancel" orders, and 7 were "fill-or-kill" orders. The rest were ordinary limit orders. 7 In January 1999, for example, 386 "put through" trades were recorded. 8 See Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) and Bailey, Chung, and Kang (1999) for details on the workings and price implications of markets that segment local and foreign trading. premium for our sample. 9 In the context of our study, this premium may be thought of as the cost to a local of buying on the Alien Board. Similarly, lost distributions and voting rights are the cost to a foreigner of buying on the Main Board.
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The database used in our study is obtained from the SET. It includes records of orders and trades on the SET for the period of January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999. Orders are timestamped to indicate the time of arrival at the exchange while trades indicate the time the order was executed, the buy and sell orders it matches, the size and price of the trade, and other information. Each order and both sides of each trade are coded for the nationality and, for local investors, type of investor. Virtually all foreign investors are institutions while domestic investors are further classified as "member" (broker-members of SET), "finance" (banks, asset management companies, and other Thai financial institutions that are not exchange members), and "others" (Thai individuals ). While our database reveals the type of investor associated with each order and trade, it does not include any identifiers for the individual investors involved in each transaction. Therefore, we cannot track the trades, holdings, or performance of individual investors.
The record of orders and trades supplied by the SET covers 58 of the more active issues listed on the SET, and 45 of these show activity on both the Main Board and the Alien Board.
We restrict our sample to the 25 most active of these stocks, to ensure that we have sufficient data for analysis and, in particular, many time periods when both the Main and Alien Board listings are active. These 25 firms account for about 96% of total market capitalization, 90% of 9 In our sample, 82% of Alien Board price premiums are positive (with a mean of 25.8%), 15% are exactly zero, and only 3% are negative (with a mean of -1.39%). We detail commissions and bid-ask spreads in Section 4.4.2 below. Transactions cost are sufficiently large that small negative foreign premiums cannot be arbitraged profitably. Furthermore, short sales were not permitted in 1999. 10 In the ten year period from December 1989 to December 1999, the dividend yield on a cap-weighted index of all Main Board shares was about 2.5 percent. Towards the end of that period, the index dividend yield declined to about 1 percent, in part due to the Asian Crisis.
total trading volume, 90% of the total number of trades, and over 94% of total value traded on the Main Board.
To construct our sample of intra-day trading, we divide each trading day into 18 fifteen- 
Computing quotes
Our data consist of trades and orders, not trades and quotes as in the TAQ database of U.S. intraday stock market trading. Some of our tests require an intraday measure of liquidity.
We use the sequence of orders and trades to construct the "book" and, therefore, the bid, ask, and depth (measured with the number of shares that can be traded at the current best bid and ask) at every point in time during the day for each stock on each board.
Computing relative price ratios
We also examine how well particular classes of investors fill their orders. Following Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) , we first compute the volume-weighted average price for all purchases of stock i on a day d,
A . We then compute the volume-weighted average price for the purchases of a particular investor type j of stock i on a day d,
B , . Finally, we compute the price ratio,
, for all purchases (or sales) by investor of type j for stock i on day d. A price ratio greater (less) than one for the purchases (sales) of a particular type of investor suggests that this investor type buys (sells) on average at a price above (below) the average price on that day.
Holding everything else equal, investor X is at disadvantage relative to investor Y for purchases (sales) if investor X buys (sells) at a higher (lower) price ratio than investor Y.
11 Results are similar whether or not overnight returns are included in the tests that use intraday data. Note that other tests of trader performance rely on daily returns.
Computing price-setting order imbalances
Some of our tests require measures of the extent to which certain types of investors are buying versus selling. For each 15 minute interval for each of our 25 stocks on each board, we compute "price-setting" order imbalances by investor type by subtracting the price-setting sell volume from the price-setting buy volume, and then normalizing by the stock's average 15-minute price-setting volume over the sample period. We attribute a trade initiated by an investor type to that investor type. A "price-setting buy" (sell) trade for foreign investors, for example, is a trade where the buy (sell) order of the foreign investors came after the sell-side (buy-side) order that it is matched to, and hence made the trade possible. We may also describe "pricesetting orders" as "marketable limit orders".
Holding period returns following purchases and sales
If investors are informed, the stocks they buy will, on average, outperform those they sell.
To measure this, we follow Odean (1999) 
where t j R , is the PACAP daily return for stock j on date t, each purchase (sale) transaction of a stock is indexed with a subscript i, i=1 to N. Note that return calculations begin the day after a purchase or a sale so as to avoid incorporating the bid-ask spread into returns. If the same stock is bought (sold) by the same type of investor on the same day, each purchase (sale) is treated as a separate transaction. Following Odean (1999) , we report tests of the statistical significance of the difference between returns following purchases and returns following sales. Given the potential for biased inference due to dependence across the returns in such a procedure, we also present results of an alternative technique (detailed below) for robustness. Table 1 On the Alien Board, orders are split almost evenly between price-setting and non pricesetting across all investor types. In contrast, only 42% of the orders of members trading on the Main Board are non price-setting, suggesting that their demand for immediacy is high and they do not largely emulate market makers.
Empirical results

Summary statistics
13 Interestingly, foreigners who cross to the Main Board also seem to be relatively impatient, with only 45 percent non price-setting volume compared to about 50 percent on the Alien Board. It suggests that cross-market foreign investors might be aggressive or non-discretionary liquidity investors, who, in spite of the cost of losing voting rights, dividend, and other distributions, cross to the "other" market in search of more favorable order execution. 13 Orders of stock exchange members are their proprietary trades, not orders executed for other investors.
Next, we examine whether particular types of securities attract a specific investor clientele. In Table 2 preference for trading stocks with higher leverage, although leverage seems to have no impact on the trading choices of other types of investors. High turnover attracts (repels) members and others (finance and foreigners) on the Main Board, and attracts (repels) others (foreigners) on the Alien Board. Thai individuals prefer to trade stocks with high return volatility on both boards, while foreigners have a preference for low return volatility. In addition, "member" and "other"
investors have a strong preference for trading bank stocks. Lagged stock returns seem to have no impact on trading preference. Again, it is evident that the choice of stock characteristics and trading venue varies substantially across different types of investors.
Liquidity and trading
In this section, we offer evidence on several dimensions of the relationship between liquidity and trading. In Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , informed investors seek to execute their trades at times when the market is liquid and active to minimize market impact and to prevent 14 We repeat the analysis using the fraction of trading volume, and the results are qualitatively similar.
other market participants inferring their information. Liquidity traders seek to minimize both the cost of trading and the potential for adverse selection. In our context, we hypothesize that our cross-market investors seek to execute their trades at times and places when liquidity is relatively higher, that is, the bid-ask spread is lower and depth is higher.
Spread, depth, and cross-market trading
For our first test, we identify, for each sample firm, five fifteen-minute time periods when trading activity of a particular type of investor on the Main (Alien) Board is particularly heavy.
We also identify five fifteen-minute time periods when this trading activity is particularly light.
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If our hypothesis is correct, we should find that liquidity (proxied with quoted spread and depth)
is particularly high in the "other" market just before the heavy cross-market trading events, and liquidity is particularly low in the "other" market just before the small cross-market trading eve nts. Table 3 presents the results of a test of this proposition. When the cross-market trades of foreigners on the Main Board are extremely heavy, the bid-ask spread (depth) is significantly smaller (larger) than the spread (depth) when foreign trading on the Main Board is very light.
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The difference is significantly different from zero. In contrast, we do not observe a significant difference in the bid-ask spread and depth between heavy and light trading events of foreigners on the Alien Board. We find similar results for the trading of Thai investors (finance, members, and "others") on the Alien Board. All four types of investors tend to trade heavily across markets when liquidity has been favorable in the "other" market. Thus, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis : cross-market orders tend to be placed at times of high market liquidity.
15 These extreme events are not clustered at a particular time of day. 16 "Depth" equals the sum of bid depth and ask depth, where bid (ask) depth is the number of shares that can be sold (bought) at the bid (ask) price.
While Table 3 supports our hypothesis that cross-market trades are motivated by higher liquidity, our univariate analysis cannot address the potential confounding effect of other factors that affect cross-market trading. Therefore we take an additional approach to uncover the motivation for investors to cross markets. To measure the extent of cross-market trading, we compute the daily fraction of Main (Alien) Board trading activity (volume or turnover) due to market-crossing foreign (Thai individual) investors. 17 The resulting daily fraction is regressed (cross section and time series) on explanatory variables including proxies for Main Board market index returns, firm size, the Alien Board price premium, dividend yield, the spread between Alien and Main Board price volatility, and the spread between Alien and Main Board bid-ask spread. To control for causality running from cross-market trading to liquidity, we compute the price volatility and bid-ask spread from the previous 30 days.
Panel A of Table 4 percent. The mean difference in average daily volatility of the previous 30 days indicates that the Alien Board typically has higher stock price variation than the Main Board. There is also a 17 We focus on foreigners and Thai individuals since they account for more than 90% of trading on the two boards.
substantial difference in bid-ask spreads between the two markets, with, on average, significantly higher transaction costs on the Alien Board.
Panel B of Table 4 The dividend yield is significantly negatively related to the fraction of cross-market trading by foreigners on the Main Board. Recall that foreign investors forgo any dividend whe n they buy Main Board shares for which the foreign ownership limit is binding. 18 Therefore, the negative slope on dividend yield supports our argument that the loss of the dividend is a significant cost to foreigners who trade on the Main Board. In contrast, the extent of crossmarket trading of Thai individuals is not significantly related to the dividend yield. The coefficients on volatility difference indicate that higher Alien Board volatility keeps foreigners trading there (rather than crossing to the Main Board), and attracts Thai individuals to the Alien Board.
Most importantly, the bid-ask spread difference is positively and significantly related to the fraction of cross-market trading by foreigners. This indicates that poor Alien Board liquidity (that is, a relatively high bid-ask spread) prompts foreigners to trade on the Main Board.
Similarly, the negative slopes on the bid-ask spread difference for Thai individuals on the Alien
Board suggests that lower liquidity on the Alien Board repels Thai individuals from trading there. 19 Thus, the results of Table 4 confirm that liquidity is an important driver of cross-market trading. We also confirm that the cost of crossing boards is likely significant to investors: Thai individuals are less likely to cross to the Alien Board at times when they have to pay a high premium to buy there.
Effectiveness in filling orders
Next, we examine the price ratios of Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) as described above.
Relative to the average buy (sell) price for a particular stock and day, we determine which type of investor typically pays (receives) a relatively low (high) price, implying a well timed and executed trade. If traders cross to the "other" market to exploit better liquidity, we would expect that cross-market trades are associated with better transaction prices (lower price when they buy and higher price when they sell). In summary, Table 5 confirms that some investors appear to move between markets to achieve advantageous prices, particularly in filling relatively large orders. These results support our hypothesis that cross-market trading is, in part, liquidity driven.
Information and trading
The previous results document associations between liquidity and trading behavior on and across the two boards. In particular, it appears that some investors select the time and venue of their trading activity to minimize trading costs. Switching between boards may not only optimize trading costs but may also help mask informed trades. In this section, we examine how cross-market trades are related to market information and whether the profitability and contribution to price discovery of cross-market trades are consistent with informed trading.
Trading on market information
We begin by examining whether patterns in cross-market trading are consistent with two types of trading strategies. First, some investors may trade across the two markets, or use information from both, to exploit persistence or reversal in stock returns with "momentum" or Netbuy are the price-setting imbalances aggregated over all investors on each board at time t. The other explanatory variables are cumulative returns over the previous five 15-minute intervals on each board, and the lagged 20 SET quotes show the depths at the three best bid and ask prices but do not identify the trader types for the orders. Therefore, we assume traders condition on the aggregate price-setting buy-sell imbalance only. 21 Pairs of related explanatory variables (lagged buy-sell imbalances and cumulative returns from both boards) may induce multicolinearity. However, our results are robust to estimating specifications with reduced numbers of variables or with orthogonalized variables.
Alien Board price premium. The above two equations are jointly estimated for each of the 25 sample firms, and the results of the individual estimates are summarized in Table 6 .
The slope coefficients on lagged aggregate buy-sell imbalances indicate whe ther the current buy-sell imbalance is correlated with the previous aggregate imbalance from either board.
The slope coefficients on lagged cumulative returns reveal momentum or contrarian trading strategies. The inclusion of lagged buy-sell imbalances and lagged cumulative returns from both boards allows us to see whether trading activity is related to behavior on the other board, implying that traders use information from both markets. The slope coefficients on the Alien Board premium can be interpreted in at least two ways. If investors trade on their belief that the Alien Board premium is mean-reverting, the slope coefficient on the Alien Board premium for The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6 . Foreigners' buy-sell imbalances are typically positively correlated only with lagged imbalances on their traded board, not the other board. In contrast, Thai individuals' buy-sell imbalances are positively correlated with lagged imbalances from both boards. This suggests that Thai individuals make use of information on relative buying pressure from both boards to guide their trading while foreigners do not. On both Main and Alien Boards, foreigner's buy-sell imbalances are typically positively correlated with lagged cumulative returns from both boards. This indicates that foreigners tend to be momentum traders, and they use returns information from both boards to guide the direction of their trading. In contrast, Thai individual buy-sell imbalances display contrarianism in the form of negative slopes on the particular board's lagged cumulative return. These results echo prior findings (for example, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes, 2001; Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2004 ) that institutional investors (such as our foreign investors) tend to pursue momentum strategies while individuals are often contrarians. Furthermore, the buy-sell imbalances of the Thai individuals on either board are less dependent on the lagged cumulative returns on the other board, suggesting that they do not use return information from both markets to the extent that foreigners do.
Comparing slope coefficients on the Alien Board premium across investor types and boards, we find that the foreign buy-sell imbalance on the Main Board increases with the Alien Board premium. This is consistent with the "risk arbitrage" story outlined above and our earlier findings that investors who trade across the two markets are particularly aggressive: when the Alien Board premium increases, aggressive foreign investors cross onto the Main Board to buy relatively underpriced shares there. Similarly, the table shows that Thai individuals tend to cross to the Alien Board and sell shares when the Alien Board premium is high, perhaps indicating that they are selling relatively overpriced shares.
On balance, these results indicate that some cross-market trading may be motivated by patterns of persistence or reversal in stock returns or in the price spread between Main and Alien boards. The results also suggest that some traders condition these aggressive trades on information from both boards.
Longer-run trading performance
If some cross-market traders sometimes cross to the "other" market to mask their informed trading, we would expect higher profits to be associated with cross-market trades. For this purpose, we next assess the longer-horizon returns on the trades of different types of investors using two methods. First, we follow Odean (1999) and compute cumulative returns after stock purchases and sales over four month and twelve month horizons. The difference between cumulative returns following purchases and cumulative returns following sales is a measure of whether these trades are profitable or not. If the difference is significantly positive and larger than one round of transaction costs, these trades reflect buying stocks with higher future returns and selling stocks with lower future returns, suggesting good timing or useful information.
To assess these returns, we must understand the relevant market frictions. Across our sample, the average bid-ask spread is 1.27% on the Main Board and 1.97% on the Alien Board.
Brokerage commissions on the SET are capped at ½ % of the value of ordinary shares traded on either board. Retail investors (such as our Thai individuals) pay the full ½ %. Local institutions can negotiate and pay approximately 0.2%. Foreigners indirectly obtain an even lower rate, about 0.1 %, by negotiating reduced fees for access to research and databases. Thus, the average total cost of a round-trip trade for local individuals is 2.27% on the Main Board and 2.97% on the Alien Board, 1.67% on the Main Board and 2.37% on the Alien Board for members and financial institutions, and 1.47% on the Main Board and 2.17% on the Alien Board for foreigners.
Panel A of Table 7 presents cumulative return results across Main Board and Alien
Board, buying and selling, and our four types of investors. On the Main Board, for both 82 day (that is, four months) and 245 day (that is, 12 months) horizons, 22 the average subsequent return to stocks bought by financial institutions is substantially less than the average subsequent return to stocks sold. The differences are minus five percent and minus 9.35 percent respectively, not including transactions costs. This suggests that Thai institutional investors do not possess useful information, echo ing some of the findings of Odean (1999) for U.S. discount brokerage customers. 23 However, on the Alien Board, finance investor returns subsequent to buys exceed returns subsequent to sells by 3.09 percent and 2.04 percent for the 82 and 245 day holding periods respectively. It suggests that some of the finance group perform well when they cross to trade on the Alien Board. Given the transaction costs outlined earlier (1.67 percent on the Main Board and 2.37 percent on the Alien Board), however, these Alien Board trades may not be significantly profitable.
For foreign investors crossing to the Main Board, returns subsequent to buys significantly exceed returns subsequent to sells by 2.14 percent and 5.14 percent for holding periods of 82 days and 245 days respectively, suggesting that those foreigners who cross onto the Main Board are good at picking stocks and timing their trades. Even after subtracting a transactions cost of 1.47 percent, foreigners typically enjoy significant profits trading on the Main Board. On the Alien Board, however, foreign performance is close to zero for both horizons. Thus, certain foreigners appear to profit from crossing to the Main Board.
For members, returns on stocks bought exceed those on stocks sold at the 245 day horizon on the Main Board but underperform on the Alien Board, suggesting that members who trade across the two markets are not particularly informed. In contrast, trades by Thai individuals (that is, "others") underperform on the Main Board net of transactions costs but overperform slightly on the Alien Board, at least before considering transactions costs. Similar to financial institutions, however, the holding period returns might not be large enough to cover transaction costs.
We repeat the analysis using market adjusted returns rather than raw returns. Specifically, the contemporaneous return on the value-weighted index of the Thai stock market is subtracted from each stock return series. 24 The table shows that results on market adjusted returns are similar to those of raw returns. We have apparently detected a class of investors, particularly foreigners, who pick stocks and time their trades effectively as they cross market to trade.
The cumulative returns in the method of Odean (1999) are essentially buy-and-hold returns following a buy or sell trading event. While accurately captur ing investors' buy-and-hold returns for a time period, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that this method may be subject to severe bias due to positive cross-correlation of firm-event returns. To address this concern, we adopt an alternative method, the calendar-time portfolio approach detailed in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) , to measure post trade performance. Starting from the first trading day of our sample period, for each type of trader on each board, we form two portfolios, "buy" and "sell", that include all stocks bought or sold respectively on that day. This yields a total of sixteen portfolios. On the second trading day, each portfolio is rebalanced to reflect the trading that occurred on the second day. We repeat this process for each trading day through the end of our sample period. The positions resulting from each order are retained in the portfolios for either 4 or 12 months. Then we compute the daily value-weighted return of all stocks in each portfolio for each trading day.
Results are reported in Panel B of Table 7 . 25 The results based on portfolio returns are generally consistent with those based on cumulative returns following Odean (1999) . In summary, we find that cross-market trades by foreigners, financial institutions, and
Thai locals are more profitable than trades conducted on "their own board". This again confirms that there is something different about cross-market trading.
Cross-market trading and price discovery
In previous sections, we have found that cross-market activity is associated with interesting patterns in terms of the timing and profitability of those trades. In this section, we test whether the presence of cross-market trading alters patterns in price discovery across the two Furthermore, the enhancement of price discovery seems unidirectional, since we do not observe any increase in price discovery from the Main Board to the Alien Board.
Panel B reports regressions that capture the impact on price discovery of foreign investors crossing to the Main Board. When foreigners cross onto the Main Board either in significant numbers or in significant proportion, Main Board returns become much more significant in explaining subsequent Alien Board returns. This result is revealed by the large number of significant positive coefficients for HIGH times lags of Main Board returns in equation (4). Thus, cross-market trading in either direction seems to be associated with enhanced transmission of information, in addition to being relatively profitable and cleverly timed. While Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) analyze market timing of both informed and uninformed traders, our finding of enhanced price discovery suggests that cross-market trades are associated with informed traders, rather than uninformed traders seeking liquidity.
In summary, we find evidence that some investors cross to the other market to exploit superior information, in addition to seeking liquidity. These investors are found among both local and foreign investor groups.
Summary and Conclusions
We study an interesting institutional arrangement, parallel markets for trading of stocks by foreign and local investors in Thailand. A summary of our major findings is as follows. Our summary statistics indicate that the extent of trading across the two boards is surprisingly large. Our liquidity-related tests indicate that cross-market orders tend to be submitted when liquidity is relatively favorable in the "other" market, and, as a consequence, these orders are filled at relatively better prices. Our information-related tests indicate that cross-market traders use market information to trade on return patterns like persistence and reversal, and on mean-reversion in the spread between Alien and Main board prices. Holding period returns following cross market trades are particularly profitable, suggesting tha t some cross-market orders represent informed trading. Finally, cross-market trades are associated with heightened price discovery, suggesting that crossmarket traders are informed investors and their trades contribute to transmitting information into the market.
The structure of stock trading in Thailand permits us to contribute unique new evidence on the workings of multi-market equity trading. Our results illustrate some of the features and implications of market microstructure models such as the role of liquidity and the extent to which informed investors appear to trade strategically. We also contribute to the ongoing debate about whether foreign investors are at a disadvantage relative to local investors. While previous studies disagree about whether locals or foreigners have better information and trading skill, we document profitable cross-market trading by both locals and foreigners.
While cross-market trading is an aggressive trading strategy that is, in some ways, costlier than remaining on one's "own" board, cross-market traders appear to skillfully exploit liquidity. Some of these traders may also be informed traders. Furthermore, their aggressive trading contributes to market efficiency by accelerating the incorporation of information into prices. While we lack information such as individual investor identifiers and characteristics to study trader motivations and performance in greater detail, our evidence appears consistent with a well-functioning financial market in the sense of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) .
Table 1. Summary Statistics on Trading Activity by Investor Type and Board
Investor types include Thai finance-related companies (banks, finance companies, insurance companies, institutional investors), stock exchange members, Thai "others" (that is, individuals), and foreigners. The sample includes the 25 most liquid stocks as measured by the number of trades from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 1999. A buy-side (sell-side) price-setting trade for an investor is a trade where the buy (sell) order of the investor came after the sell-side (buy-side) order and hence made the trade possible. Trades that could not be classified account for 9.28% and 8.23% of total trading values on Alien and Main board respectively. For each stock, we select the ten fifteen-minute intervals with the five largest and five smallest trading volumes for each type of investor on each board. Investor types include Thai finance-related companies (banks, finance companies, insurance companies, institutional investors), stock exchange members, Thai "others" (that is, individuals), and foreigners. We then compute the average spread and depth over window (-3, -1) for each event, and compare the mean spread and mean depth of the 5 largest and the 5 smallest trading events. Spread and depth are computed as (ask -bid)/(ask + bid)/2 and (bid depth + ask depth) respectively (where bid (ask) depth is the number of shares that can be sold (bought) at the bid (ask) price), and then standardized by subtracting the average and dividing by the average for all observations for the same stock over the entire sample period. Standard t-tests are conducted to examine the difference and p-values are reported in parentheses. 
Extreme Trading Events on Main Board Extreme Trading Events on Alien Board
The dependent variables, Odean (1999) and compute cumulative returns (82 days or 245 days) beginning with the day after each buy or sell trade. In Panel B, we compute portfolio returns as follows. Starting from the first trading day of our sample period, for each type of trader on each board, we form two buy and sell stock portfolios including all stocks bought or sold on that day respectively. On the second trading day, each portfolio is rebalanced to reflect trading on the second day. We repeat this for each trading day until the end of our sample period. The shares from each order are kept in the portfolios for either 4 or 12 months. We then compute value-weighted returns of all stocks in each portfolio on each trading day. The difference in returns associated with buy trades versus sell trades is a measure of the effectiveness or informedness of the particular type of investor (Odean, 1999 
